Donald Trump’s first presidency left a lasting impression on global geopolitics, particularly in the way the United States (U.S.) interacted with its allies and adversaries. His second term in 2025 continued this trajectory, but introduced a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy—realigning allies, supporting right-wing alliances in Europe, challenging the existing international world order and to reshape the security dynamics in Europe. His “America First” ideology, promoted protectionist policies by imposing tariffs and trade barriers, and dismantling of U.S. Agency International Development (USAID) and soft power. He had push for redefining international norms and sovereignty, even pushing for controversial proposals like acquiring Greenland and annexing Canada.
Trump’s “America First” approach altered global economic dynamics, introducing a degree of uncertainty into world politics as he endeavored to redefine politics and power structures. A particularly significant aspect of Trump’s Asia policy—one that developed during his first term and could potentially extend into a hypothetical second term—was the relationship with India, which presented both opportunities and challenges for the nation. The U.S.-India alliance experienced was significantly strengthened during the initial Trump administration, and as part of the strategic partnership with India, several key diplomatic and defense cooperation agreements were established. However, Trump’s approach to India was not only focused on bilateral ties; it also has significant ramifications for regional geopolitics, particularly with China. This was most evident in the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), also known as Quad, in November 2017 after its initial collapse in 2008, and the subsequent escalation of Sino-Indian tensions, which had defined much of India’s foreign policy calculus during the first Trump administration.
In his first term, Trump aggressively promoted the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s contemporary approach of “Indo-Pacific”—the “dynamic coupling” of the Indian and Pacific Oceans —and the concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” to counter China’s influence in the region. This vision was consistent with India’s strategic interests in maintaining freedom of navigation and safeguarding the maritime route in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Despite trade tensions between the U.S. and India, Trump’s reactivation of the Quad was a critical component of this plan, suggesting a substantial shift in regional alignments and strengthening partnership between the two countries to confront China. Still, the impact of the Quad is difficult to assess, as its operational limitations are overlooked. Nevertheless, it remains a symbolic victory for Indo-Pacific security cooperation. Unlike North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it lacks formal military mandate or binding commitments, functioning instead as a “loose” coalition. Divergent priorities with China from economic ties to regional stability to resisting anti-China rhetoric are another critical situation among the members countries which further constrain its efficacy. In response to these limits, India has actively pursued the Act East Policy (AEP) as a means of counterbalancing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for regional dominance; nonetheless, it has failed to achieve the desired results.
As Trump’s foreign policy realignment progressed, India became vital to U.S. strategic considerations in Asia, particularly in light of escalating apprehensions regarding China’s rise and its ramifications for international norms and regulations. On the other side of the equation, Sino-Indian tensions rose during the first Trump administration, with the Doklam (Donglang) military standoff between India and China in 2017, followed by the Galwan valley clash in 2020, the deadliest clash in 45 years, which resulted in a months-long military standoff between India and China. India’s growing cooperation with the U.S. was evident during these crises; while there was no direct intervention, the U.S. provided diplomatic support and intelligence sharing, encouraging India to take a more assertive posture against China. While India profited from strengthened ties with the U.S., it also found itself in a more uncertain situation vis-à-vis China.
While China’s response to the rapprochement between the U.S. and India has strengthened its ties with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal, all of which are critical to India’s regional security. This balancing attitude by Beijing is perceived by New Delhi as a “strategic encirclement” of India, resulting in increased pressure on New Delhi. Beijing’s rising infrastructure investments in those countries contributed to the burden on New Delhi, raising worry in the power corridor as it failed to compete with China in influencing its close neighbors. While China’s rising regional investments have pushed on New Delhi, it has not been inactive either. It promoted defense cooperation with Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam and Indonesia (for instance, it signed new defense cooperation with Indonesia in May 2018). Projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) linking India to Myanmar, and investments in Iran’s Chabahar Port are measures taken by India to counterbalance China’s influence. Domestically, Modi’s alliance with Trump resonated with nationalist narratives placing India as a global power, as well as economic imperatives such as courting U.S. tech investment and addressing the issue of unemployment, which encouraged closer ties.
India found itself in a difficult position due to the mounting pressure from the U.S. to adopt a more adversarial stance against China, yet, it continued to engage diplomatically with Beijing. While the Quad strengthens India’s regional position, its practical influence on countering China is mostly aspirational rather than transformative. Although, the two nations have defense partnership, India had so far avoided any formal military alliances with the U.S. On the other hand, India’s lagging regional influence compared to China in its immediate neighbors, simultaneously strengthening relationship with the U.S. and the timing of the recent visit of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the U.S. illustrates the complexity of its diplomatic strategy in trying to prioritize its relationship with Washington, despite the long-term uncertainty in regional stability.
Trump took a hardline, confrontational approach toward China, treating it as an aggressive strategic competitor. To confront China, Trump’s approach was supportive but transactional on allies, and reinforced a military-first rebalance by building it on President Obama’s “pivot to Asia” strategy. While, the approach created a short-term opportunity for India to attract manufacturing shifts from China to India, but observing the economic realities present a different picture. For instance, bilateral trade between India and China rose from $84.44 billion (India’s imports from China stood at $68.1 billion) in 2017 to $118.4 billion (India’s imports from China stood at $101.7 billion) in 2024 surpassing U.S. as top India’s trading partner with heavy reliance on Chinese imports in critical sectors such as pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and advanced technology. The numbers plainly demonstrate India’s reliance on China, and this forces India to tread carefully with China; despite aligning with the U.S. on security, New Delhi cannot afford to fully antagonize Beijing, which remains a crucial economic partner.
Trump’s India strategy was driven by a desire to challenge China by leveraging U.S. power and projecting India as a strategic alternative to China. It elevated India to the forefront of the Indo-Pacific policy aimed at countering China’s rising power. However, this approach intensified tensions with China, forcing India to adopt a more confrontational position. While, Trump’s calculated focus on China had created avenues for India to assert its influence in the region, yet, it has also triggered a series of confrontations along the Sino-Indian border and in regional diplomacy. For India, this created a situation of no clearly defined policy as to how India would produce a new leverage vis-à-vis China by strengthening its relations with the U.S., and at the same time, it is not clear if India prefers regional stability or continue taking the adversarial stance against China, and to continue the role of an option for U.S. strategic calculation in Asia.
For India, Modi’s “over enthusiastic gestures and relationship” with Trump overlook the basic norm of maintaining a balanced relationship, particularly with China, and other great powers in regional diplomacy. It’s multi-alignment strategy as part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) cooperation and QUAD are a careful move to help it navigate around dual pressures, yet, for Modi and India, the challenge lies in leveraging the partnership with U.S. to bolster military and technological capabilities without antagonizing Beijing to the point of economic retaliation and prolonged border conflict.
The uncertainty lies in whether a future U.S. administration will abandon Trump’s transactional approach, leaving India exposed to a shrinking diplomatic space. New Delhi must carefully navigate the tightrope to balance its alliances, or it risks being find itself into a zero-sum trap or an irreconcilable alignment. While the long-term impact of Trump’s India strategy will depend on how India navigates its relationship with both U.S. and China, Trump has solidified India’s position as a key U.S. ally in the region, while, simultaneously creating a more complex and competitive environment with China. Trump’s India strategy is a masterstroke in alliance-building but a misstep in regional stability, risking India towards a forced alignment in a binary geopolitical framework. At the same time, it could accelerate India’s risky rise as a swing state, caught in the conflicting forces of an increasingly polarized world.
About the Author: Augustine R. is an independent analyst and researcher specializing in international relations and geopolitical affairs. With a background in international relations, trade, and development, his interests span global security and economic diplomacy, while his focus includes the China-India-Myanmar strategic triangle, Sino-Indian relations, and the foreign policies of the U.S., India, and China. Click here to view all articles by the author.
Featured Image: U.S. President Donald Trump and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi shake hands during a news conference on February 13, 2025 [Alex Brandon/AP Photo]